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INTRODUCTION

Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) criminal investigations
have become an increasingly routine feature on the corporate
landscape.1 However, as the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) have ramped up their
domestic enforcement of the FCPA, there has been a lack of
transparency and guidance coupled with much after-the-fact
prosecution of U.S.-based companies.2 Although the DOJ provides
proactive guidance by issuing advisory opinions to companies at the
outset of business transactions through its DOJ FCPA Opinion
Release Procedure,3 this procedure is seldom used by businesses, as it
is perceived to be costly, cumbersome, potentially invasive, and timeconsuming.4 The DOJ Opinion Procedure allows businesses to
submit information about their prospective conduct to the DOJ, after
which the DOJ issues an advisory opinion on whether the party’s
proposed conduct conforms to anti-bribery enforcement policy.5 If
the DOJ finds that the requestor’s conduct conforms to the present
FCPA enforcement policy, there will be a rebuttable presumption that
the requestor’s conduct is in compliance with the FCPA.6 As FCPA
enforcement continues to rise, it remains to be seen whether the DOJ
Opinion Procedure will reach its powerful potential as a proactive
method of compliance. Potentially exacerbating the problem is the
lack of literature specifically addressing strategic uses of the DOJ
Opinion Procedure for companies contemplating prospective
transactions or payments that may implicate the FCPA.
* J.D. Candidate 2015, SMU Dedman School of Law; B.A. International
Affairs and B.A. Philosophy 2010, the George Washington University. The author
would like to thank his wife, Courtney, as well as his family and friends for their
love and support. The author would also like to thank the Hatton W. Sumners
Foundation, the Dallas Bar Foundation, and the SMU Law Review Association.
1

See infra Part II.
See Amy Deen Westbrook, Enthusiastic Enforcement, Informal Legislation:
The Unruly Expansion of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 45 GA. L. REV. 489,
499–500 (2011).
3
See infra Part V.
4
See infra Part IV.A.
5
28 C.F.R. § 80.1 (2014).
6
See id. § 80.10.
2
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Part I of this article provides an overview of current FCPA
enforcement and trends, along with common challenges that
businesses face in complying with the FCPA.7 Next, Part II analyzes
the murky beginnings and increasing clarity of the DOJ Opinion
Procedure through subsequent congressional amendments and
through a recent SEC and DOJ informal FCPA publication.8 Parts III
and IV discuss when and how to use the DOJ Opinion Procedure to a
business’s advantage and how to avoid common pitfalls.9 Taking
potential concerns into consideration, a business should ultimately
use the DOJ FCPA Opinion Procedure when the business (1) is truly
uncertain about the lawfulness of prospective activity, (2) believes
that the information it will provide the DOJ will not be disclosed (or
will not cause injury if disclosed), and (3) believes that the protection
afforded will outweigh potential harm to the business if it does not
disclose its prospective conduct and is later challenged on it.10
Part V outlines in detail the procedures for successfully
submitting a DOJ FCPA Opinion Request.11 Finally, Part VI
evaluates whether the benefits of strategically using the DOJ FCPA
Opinion Procedure extend to voluntarily disclosing actual or potential
FCPA violations, concluding that that the empirical evidence does
not support this view in spite of DOJ rhetoric to the contrary.12
Although the DOJ Opinion Procedure remains an underutilized,
extremely valuable tool for advisory opinions, the benefits of the
procedure do not appear to extend to voluntary disclosures of FCPA
violations at this time.13
II.

THE CURRENT FCPA LANDSCAPE

The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act14 was enacted with the
7

See infra Part I.
See infra Part II.
9
See infra Parts III–IV.
10
See infra Part IV.B.
11
See infra Part V.
12
See infra Part VI.
13
See infra Part VI.
14
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b), (d)(1),
(g)-(h), 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78dd-3, 78ff (2012), amended by Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act Amendment of 1988, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to 78dd-3, 78ff (2012),
8
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goal of “restor[ing] public confidence in the integrity of the
marketplace”15 by addressing corruption through anti-bribery and
record-keeping provisions.16 The impetus for passage of the FCPA
came from reports of U.S. companies making bribes both
domestically and abroad.17 An SEC investigation reported to
Congress in 1976 that more than 400 companies (including more than
117 respected Fortune 500 companies in a variety of industries) had
admitted to making illegal or improper payments overseas, estimated
to exceed $300 million.18
Today, for many American businesses trying to compete and
survive by developing international business relationships and
pursuing transactional opportunities abroad,19 the FCPA is the most
important U.S. law governing international business.20 Since its
passage in 1977, the FCPA prohibits U.S. citizens, foreign companies
listed on a U.S. stock exchange, and entities physically present in the
U.S. from offering or promising to pay a foreign official “anything of

and the International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§
78dd-1 to 78dd-3, 78ff (2012).
15
U.S. Dep’t of Justice & U.S. Secs. & Exch. Comm’n, A Resource Guide to
the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 14, 2012) [hereinafter Resource
Guide], available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/guide.pdf; see also
Fraud Section, U.S. Dep't of Justice & Office of the Chief Counsel for Int’l
Commerce, U.S. Dep't of Comm., Lay Person’s Guide to the FCPA (2010),
available at http://insct.syr.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/lay-persons-guide.pdf
(noting that “[t]he FCPA was intended to have and has had an enormous impact on
the way American firms do business.”).
16
Bruce Hinchey, Punishing the Penitent: Disproportionate Fines in Recent
FCPA Enforcements and Suggested Improvements, 40 PUB. CONT. L.J. 393, 394-95
(2011).
17
Westbrook, supra note 2, at 499–500.
18
Id.
19
See Mike Koehler, The Facade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT'L L.
907, 997–98 (2010) (noting that American businesses are looking outside of the
United States in large part due to “the increase in globalization and the saturation of
domestic markets, it is no longer just large resource extraction companies that are
doing business in overseas markets. If the increase in FCPA enforcement over the
last decade has taught us anything, it is that large and small companies in all
industries face FCPA risk and exposure.”).
20
Dieter Juedes, Taming the FCPA Overreach Through an Adequate
Procedures Defense, 4 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 37, 39 (2013) (citing Koehler,
supra note 19, at 997).
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value” to obtain or retain business.21 To further promote anti-bribery,
the FCPA accounting provisions require domestic and foreign
companies traded on U.S. stock exchanges to regularly provide
reports to the SEC, maintain accurate records, and create internal
compliance controls that accurately reflect payments to foreign
officials.22 In effect, the FCPA provisions work together, as the
FCPA bribery provision punishes instances of bribery, while the
FCPA books and records provision helps detect bribery in the first
place.23
For many businesses in the United States that undertake extensive
promotional activities to market and sell their products
internationally, such efforts may involve paying the expenses of
international customers to travel to the company’s facilities for
product demonstrations, training programs, and conferences.24
However, if the international customer happens to be a government
official or an individual affiliated with a foreign governmentcontrolled enterprise—which often is not readily apparent—the
company’s payments for the customer’s expenses may be seen as
bribes in violation of the FCPA.25 The FCPA prohibits giving (or
even offering) “anything of value” to foreign government officials in
order to gain the official’s influence in obtaining or retaining
business or an improper advantage.26 Though the FCPA does not
define the term “value,” the DOJ has enforced the term broadly to
include both tangible and intangible benefits.27 Accordingly, paying
21

Id. at 39 n.4 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a)(1), 78dd-2(a)(1), 78dd-3(a)(1)
(2012)).
22
Id. at 39; James A. Barta & Julia Chapman, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 825, 827 (2012) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a)-(b) (2012)).
23
Juedes, supra note 20, at 39–40.
24
Richard M. Strassberg & Kyle A. Wombolt, Beware Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act Traps, N.Y. L.J. (July 21, 2008), available at
http://www.goodwinprocter.com/~/media/Files/Publications/Attorney%20Articles/
2008/Beware_Foreign_Corrupt_Practices_Act_Traps.pdf.
25
Id.
26
Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a) (2012)) (emphasis added).
27
Id. (noting as an example that businesses paying expenses for customers to
attend product demonstrations “would be construed as providing those customers
with something of ‘value’ under the Act”); see also Ashby Jones, Highlights from
the Long-Awaited FCPA Guidance, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Nov. 14, 2012, 2:24
PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2012/11/14/highlights-from-the-long-awaited-fcpa-
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expenses for customers to attend product trainings or demonstrations
would be construed as providing something of “value” under the
FCPA, and thus, such payments and situations may implicate the
FCPA.28
Consequently, companies should proceed with caution and take
steps to ensure that payments for promotional activities are legitimate
business expenditures capable of withstanding the scrutiny demanded
by the FCPA.29 The level of requisite caution and due diligence,
however, depends in large part on the scope and intensity of current
DOJ and SEC FCPA enforcement.
A.

Enforcement of the FCPA

While the DOJ and SEC initiated just two or three FCPA cases
per year during the FCPA’s first twenty-eight years, and related fines
seldom exceeded $1 million, times have clearly changed.30 The DOJ
now considers enforcing the FCPA as “one of its top priorities—
second only to fighting terrorism.”31 The number of cases has
“skyrocketed” in the current era,32 as the SEC and the DOJ have

guidance/ (explaining that the FCPA does not contain a minimum threshold amount
for corrupt payments or gifts under the FCPA “anything of value” statutory
language, but that it is unlikely that taxi fare or coffee provisions would ever
evidence the sufficient corrupt intent to be more than nominal value).
28
Strassberg & Wombolt, supra note 24. However, “not all payments to
foreign officials [or government representatives] are banned by the FCPA. The
FCPA includes as an affirmative defense payments that are ‘reasonable and bona
fide’ expenditures, ‘such as travel and lodging expenses, incurred by or on behalf
of a foreign official’ as long as the payments are ‘directly related’ to ‘the
promotion, demonstration or explanation of products or services’ or the ‘execution
of performance of a contract with a foreign government or agency thereof.’” Id.
Despite being labeled as an “affirmative defense,” however, the provision merely
clarifies the type of conduct covered by the FCPA. Id.
29
Id.
30
Id. at 495.
31
Juedes, supra note 20, at 40–41.
32
Roger M. Witten et al., Prescriptions for Compliance with the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act: Identifying Bribery Risks and Implementing Anti-Bribery
Controls in Pharmaceutical and Life Sciences Companies, 64 BUS. LAW. 691, 691–
92 (2009).
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brought ten times as many cases as in prior years,33 with fines
increasing dramatically and settlement amounts dwarfing previous
records.34 The agencies do not appear to have any intent of relenting
from increased FCPA enforcement, as the SEC created a specialized
unit in 2010 to be “more proactive” in FCPA enforcement,35 and the
head of the DOJ’s criminal division has reaffirmed that the agency is
“in a new era of FCPA enforcement[,] and [it is] here to stay.”36
Preliminary data suggests that the SEC and the DOJ have continued
their aggressive cross-border enforcement of the FCPA in 2014.37
In order to develop new strategies for FCPA compliance,
enforcement agencies have recently focused on international
cooperation and incentivizing companies to disclose employee
violations.38 First, an increase in international cooperation on anti-

33

Westbrook, supra note 2, at 495–96 (noting that while the SEC and the DOJ
"typically initiated just two or three cases a year" during the FCPA's first twentyeight years of enforcement, since 2007, government agencies have brought ten
times as many enforcement actions). In 2010, for example, government agencies
initiated a whopping 74 enforcement actions; in 2011, there were 48 enforcement
actions; in 2012, there were 23 enforcement actions; and in 2013, there were 27
enforcement actions. 2014 Mid-Year FCPA Update, GIBSON, DUNN, & CRUTCHER
LLP
(July
7,
2014),
available
at
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/2014-Mid-Year-FCPAUpdate.aspx.
34
Westbrook, supra note 2, at 496 n.22 (“Eight of the ten highest monetary
penalties in FCPA-related settlements were reached in 2010.”). In 2012, there were
a total of twenty-three FCPA enforcement actions. 2012 Year-End FCPA Update,
GIBSON, DUNN, & CRUTCHER LLP (Jan. 2, 2013), available at
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/2012YearEndFCPAUpdate.p
df. In 2013, the total number of FCPA enforcement actions was again on the rise,
with twenty-seven agency actions. 2013 Year-End FCPA Update, GIBSON, DUNN,
&
CRUTCHER
LLP
(Jan.
6,
2014),
available
at
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/2013-Year-End-FCPAUpdate.pdf.
35
Cheryl Scarboro, Chief of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Unit, U.S. Sec.
& Exch. Comm'n, Remarks at News Conference Announcing New SEC Leaders in
Enforcement
Division
(Jan.
13,
2010),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch011310newsconf.htm.
36
Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Att'y Gen., Speech at 24th National Conference
on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 16, 2010), available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/ 2010/crm-speech-101116.html.
37
2014 Mid-Year FCPA Update, supra note 33.
38
Barta & Chapman, supra note 22, at 827–28.
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bribery enforcement has aided U.S. domestic enforcement efforts.39
Second, companies are increasingly presented with incentives to
disclose employee violations to obtain favorable treatment instead of
facing aggressive prosecution.40 Finally, the SEC and the DOJ
continue to interpret the FCPA’s jurisdiction broadly to include
conduct outside of the United States.41
1.

International Enforcement Efforts

In addition to having familiarity and awareness of DOJ and SEC
FCPA enforcement, companies must also focus beyond the American
regulatory sphere, as “[o]ther countries have joined the United States
in a push for wider investigations [of,] and larger penalties” for antibribery.42 For example, a landmark U.K. Bribery Act enacted in
2010 appears to overtake the FCPA as the most wide-ranging and
aggressive international anti-bribery statute.43 Since its passage,
“[t]he revolutionary U.K. Bribery Act 2010 is still causing ripples of
uncertainty in the United Kingdom and global business communities,
despite the [U.K.]’s efforts to enforce the Act in such a way that
‘ethical companies have nothing to fear.’”44 Although the few

39

Id. at 828.
Id.
41
Id. at 827–28.
42
FCPA/Anti-Bribery Spring Alert 2011, HUGHES HUBBARD & REED LLP,
June
2011,
at
i,
available
at
http://www.hugheshubbard.com/NewsDocuments/Hughes%20Hubbard%20FCPA
%20Anti-Bribery%20Alert%20Spring%202011%20PART1[1].pdf.
43
Id.; see also FCPA/Anti-Bribery Alert Winter 2013, HUGHES HUBBARD &
REED
LLP,
December
2013,
at
i,
available
at
http://www.hugheshubbard.com/PublicationDocuments/FCPA%20AntiBribery%20Alert%20Winter%202013.pdf (noting three years after the introduction
of the U.K. Bribery Act that “[w]here once enforcement of the U.K. Bribery Act
seemed a paper tiger, we now see active prosecutions”). The U.K. Bribery Act also
appears to lack recognized FCPA exceptions such as the “exception for ‘facilitating
or expediting payments’ made in furtherance of routine governmental action . . . .”
Id. at 29. Such payments could subject a business to sanctions under the U.K.
Bribery Act. Id.
44
Id. at 265. In fact, due to the U.K. Bribery Act’s “sweeping scope,” it has
not only received criticism from business circles, but the U.K. Ministry of Justice
also delayed the Act’s implementation until July 1, 2011—seven months after the
40
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prosecutions of the U.K. Bribery Act have left the international
business community with little guidance, Director David Green
clarified that further prosecutions under the U.K. Bribery Act would
be forthcoming.45 Furthermore, in addition to the U.K., other
countries such as Germany, and surprising newcomers including
Australia and Canada, are now willing to investigate and prosecute
instances of corruption.46
Regarding comparative levels of international anti-bribery
enforcement, seven countries—the United States, the United
Kingdom, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Norway, and Switzerland—
have been classified as “active” anti-bribery corruption enforcers by
Transparency International,47 meaning that these countries “were
among the [eleven] largest exporters in the world, have at least ten
major cases, initiated at least three major cases in the last three years,
and concluded at least three major cases with substantial sanctions.”48
Another nine countries—Argentina, Belgium, Finland, France, Japan,
South Korea, the Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden—are classified as
“moderate” enforcers, meaning that the countries have at least one
major case along with other active investigations.49 Accordingly, due
to the global nature of anti-bribery enforcement, while U.S.

date initially promised—to allow the business community time to adjust to the new
compliance policies. Id. at 267.
45
Id.
46
FCPA/Anti-Bribery Spring Alert 2011, supra note 42, at i, 2 (stating that
“countries, such as Germany, are more willing than ever to investigate and
prosecute corruption. . . . [Germany] has over 100 open corruption investigations . .
. .”); FCPA/Anti-Bribery Winter Alert 2013, supra note 43, at i (noting that “where
we once wondered if non-U.S. governments would continue to strengthen and
enforce anti-bribery laws, we see resounding confirmation in the form of
investigations and enforcement activity from heretofore unseen jurisdictions such
as Australia and Canada.”).
47
Transparency International is a non-governmental organization with chapters
in more than 100 countries whose “[m]ission is to stop corruption and promote
transparency, accountability and integrity at all levels and across all sectors of
society.” Mission, Vision, and Values, TRANSPARENCY INT’L (Oct. 16, 2011),
http://www.transparency.org/whoweare/organisation/ mission_vision_and_values.
48
FCPA/Anti-Bribery Spring Alert 2011, supra note 42, at 121.
49
Id. at 121–22. Interestingly, Transparency International’s 2010 Progress
Report identified the primary cause of global FCPA under enforcement as a “lack
of political will,” which arises in the obstruction of investigations and failure to
fund and staff enforcement-related efforts. Id. at 122.
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businesses are justifiably focused on FCPA enforcement, it is
becoming increasingly important for companies to not lose sight of
non-U.S. anti-bribery enforcement systems that their actions may
implicate.
2.

Recent FCPA Enforcement Trends

After a momentary decrease in the number of enforcement
actions between 2010—which had a record-high number of
enforcement actions—and 2012, enforcement actions in 2013
increased by 17%.50 Furthermore, the market rate for resolving an
FCPA enforcement action for corporations “spiked precipitously in
2013,” as there was a nearly fourfold increase for the average closing
price for corporate FCPA resolutions, which includes DOJ and SEC
fines, penalties, disgorgement, and prejudgment interest.51 In
addition, two of the nine total corporate FCPA resolutions in 2013
made the “FCPA Top 10” list for the ten highest FCPA settlements in
U.S. history.52 While speaking at the 2013 American Conference
Institute FCPA Conference about FCPA cases on the horizon, the
DOJ’s FCPA Unit Chief stated that he expected more “top 10 quality
type cases” in 2014.53
With regard to industries affected by FCPA enforcement actions,
although the DOJ and the SEC in 2013 brought actions against
traditionally “high risk” FCPA industries such as oil, petroleum
services, and medical devices, the agencies also pursued prosecutions
in industries not normally associated with the FCPA, such as clothing
and automated teller machine manufacturing.54 Finally, although
new leadership was put in place at both the DOJ and the SEC early in
50

See 2013 Year-End FCPA Update, supra note 34 (noting that the total
enforcement actions in 2012 was twenty-three and total enforcement actions in
2013 was twenty-seven). “2013 marked another year of vigorous international
anti-corruption enforcement” due to (1) “a return to the robust enforcement totals
of recent years,” (2) “a nearly fourfold increase in the size of the average corporate
fine,” (3) “increas[ed] aggressive deployment of traditional criminal investigative
techniques,” and (4) “the expansion of multijurisdictional, cross-border cooperation
and prosecution . . . .” Id. at 1.
51
Id. at 3.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 8.
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2013, and a few prosecutors have left the FCPA enforcement practice
for in-house legal departments or private practice, there are
sufficiently seasoned remaining FCPA prosecutors so as to “not
expect any break in the drumbeat of further prosecutions.”55 This
increase in overall enforcement, coupled with increased average
corporate fines, appears to indicate continued, vigorous FCPA
enforcement.56
B.

Challenges that Businesses Face when Attempting to Comply
with the FCPA

The FCPA is one of the most feared statutes for U.S. businesses
operating overseas. This is due in large part to perfect FCPA
compliance being extremely difficult or unlikely due to the statute’s
expansive language, the absence of available judicial and
administrative guidance, and the inherent realities involved in
generating business globally.57 Because the FCPA has been amended
twice in its history but has not received sustained congressional
attention nor been the subject of formal rulemaking, along with the
FCPA being seldom litigated,58 there is little interpretation of the
Act.59 Consequently, businesses and individuals that intend to
comply with the FCPA have to do so with scant legislative or judicial
guidance.
Both the DOJ and the SEC have taken expansive interpretations
of the FCPA’s definition of “foreign official.”60 Although the FCPA
statute defines “[t]he term ‘foreign official’ [as an] officer or
employee of a foreign government or any department, agency, or

55

Id. at 20.
Id.
57
Juedes, supra note 20, at 42.
58
Westbrook, supra note 2, at 562.
59
Juedes, supra note 20, at 42–45.
60
Id. at 43–44; see 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a) (2012); Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 27 (2011) (statement of the Hon. Michael
B. Mukasey, Partner, Debevoise & Plimpton LLP) (“The DOJ's and SEC's
enforcement . . . make clear that they interpret the terms ‘foreign official’ and
‘instrumentality’ extremely broadly.”).
56

Fall 2014

Navigating the DOJ FCPA Opinion Procedure

295

instrumentality thereof . . . ,”61 the meaning of the term
“instrumentality,” which is not at all clear or intuitive, is not defined
by the statute.62
Importantly, the DOJ and the SEC have also failed to provide a
list of factors for determining whether a party is an instrumentality of
a foreign government, and neither agency has clarified the term in a
meaningful way.63 In fact:
the DOJ has [brazenly] admitted that ‘it is entirely
possible, under certain circumstances and in certain
countries, that nearly every aspect of the approval,
manufacture, import, export, pricing, sale and
marketing of a drug product in a foreign country will
involve a ‘foreign official’ within the meaning of the
FCPA.64
The DOJ has admitted that it does not support a change in the
definition or its interpretation of “foreign official” or
“instrumentality” because if companies are “not paying bribes,” they
should have nothing to fear.65 Such ambiguity of FCPA key terms is
especially problematic in light of the fact that the broad
61

15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(f)(1)(A), 78dd-2(h)(2)(A), 78dd-3(f)(2)(A) (2012)
(emphasis added).
62
Joseph W. Yockey, Solicitation, Extortion, and the FCPA, 87 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 781, 820 (2011) (noting that “the confusion surrounding this language
centers on the ambiguous term ‘instrumentality[,]’ . . . [which] the FCPA does not
define . . . .”).
63
Juedes, supra note 20, at 44.
64
Id. (quoting DOJ's FCPA Team Pressing Forward With Pharma Probes,
MCGUIRE WOODS LLP (July 20, 2010), http://www.mcguirewoods.com/ClientResources/Alerts/2010/7/DOJsFCPATeamPressingForwardwithPharmaProbes.asp
x).
65
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime,
Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 67
(2011) (DOJ Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen. Greg Andres), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/_files/hearings/printers/112th/112-47_66886.PDF
(noting that the DOJ “[does not] support a change in the definition of foreign
official . . . [or instrumentality] because we are fearful . . . [of] a bright line rule
with respect to who constitutes a foreign official. [The DOJ believes] if companies
are not paying bribes, that there is really no fear of prosecution from FCPA
enforcement.”).
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“instrumentality” interpretation has periodically been applied to
payments to foreign officials of companies that have state-owned
interests.66 Once a company with a state-controlled or stateinfluenced interest has been seen by the DOJ and the SEC as an
instrumentality under the FCPA, all employees or agents of the
company are considered to be “foreign officials.”67 For example, the
DOJ and the SEC alleged that American construction company KBR
made improper payments to “foreign officials” who were employees
of Nigeria LNG Limited.68 The agencies claimed that these
employees were “foreign officials” for purposes of the FCPA, despite
the Nigerian government having only a 49% ownership stake in
Nigeria LNG Limited, while 51% of the company was owned by a
consortium of private multinational oil companies, such as Shell,
Total, and Eni.69 KBR eventually settled with the government,
without the government ever clarifying its interpretation of “foreign
official” publicly.70
The KBR example is illustrative in that even if a company is
majority-owned by private, non-governmental entities, as long as the
company has some state-controlled ownership, the SEC and the DOJ
may consider any of the company’s employees “foreign officials”
under the FCPA.71 Such a questionable interpretation not only
prevents businesses from reliably determining which companies are
sufficiently state-owned to qualify as an instrumentality of foreign
officials, but it also presents serious difficulties in countries like
China, where state ownership is prevalent.72
For instance,
66

Id. at 44–45.
Id. at 44.
68
Mike Koehler, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the Ultimate Year of
Its Decade of Resurgence, 43 IND. L. REV. 389, 412–13 (2010).
69
Id.; Our Company Shareholders, NIGERIA LNG LIMITED,
http://www.nlng.com/PageEngine.aspx?&id=43 (last visited Jan. 30, 2014).
70
See SEC Charges KBR, Inc. with Foreign Bribery, Litigation Release No.
20897A,
95
SEC
Docket
570
(Feb.
11,
2009),
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2009/lr20897a.htm.
71
Koehler, supra note 68, at 413.
72
See Andrew Weissmann & Alixandra Smith, U.S. Chamber Inst. for Legal
Reform, Restoring Balance: Proposed Amendments to the Foreign Corrupt
Practices
Act
6
(2010),
available
at
http://ilr.iwssites.com/uploads/sites/1/restoringbalance_fcpa.pdf (noting that the
FCPA “should take into account the realities that confront businesses that operate
67

Fall 2014

Navigating the DOJ FCPA Opinion Procedure

297

pharmaceutical companies operating abroad are increasingly exposed
to FCPA liability because they often interact with doctors, nurses,
and hospitals that fall within the “government employee”
proscription.73
However, there are faint signs of progress on this front, as
members of Congress have encouraged the DOJ to articulate and
clarify “under what circumstances an employee of an instrumentality
who is not exercising the sovereign authority of the state may be
considered a ‘foreign official.’”74
III.

HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOJ FCPA OPINION
PROCEDURE

The FCPA Opinion Procedure has evolved from its roots as an
informal and discretionary system in the 1980s to a standardized
process providing parties that seek guidance more assurance,
responsiveness, and confidentiality than was originally provided to
them.75 The FCPA Opinion Procedure allows businesses to obtain
the advisory opinion of the DOJ on whether the business’s
prospective conduct conforms with, or would violate, the DOJ’s
present anti-bribery enforcement policy.76 If the DOJ finds that the

in countries with endemic corruption . . . or in countries where many companies are
state-owned (e.g., China) and it therefore may not be immediately apparent whether
an individual is considered a ‘foreign official’ within the meaning of the act.”); see
also Koehler, supra note 68, at 413 (criticizing the DOJ and the SEC’s charging
documents in such contexts that “contain little more than mere conclusory legal
statements as to the key ‘foreign official’ element . . . [T]he SEC’s complaint
against Oscar Meza . . . is silent as to any factual evidence supporting the theory
that employees of unidentified ‘Chinese state-owned companies’ are ‘foreign
officials.’”).
73
Johnathan D. Rockoff & Christopher M. Matthews, Pfizer Settles Federal
Bribery
Investigation,
WALL
S T.
J.,
Aug.
8,
2012,
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100008723963904442469045775751107231
50588.
74
Letter from Amy Klobuchar, U.S. Senator (Democrat, Minn.), & Chris
Coons, U.S. Senator (Democrat, Del.), to Eric Holder, Attorney Gen. (Feb. 15,
2012),
available
at
http://www.mainjustice.com/justanticorruption/wpadmin/documents-databases/265-2-judiciary_FCPA_02_16_12[1].pdf.
75
KEVIN T. ABIKOFF, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: AVOIDING AND RESPONDING
TO MISCONDUCT § 18.08 (Law Journal Seminars-Press, 2007 & Supp. 2013).
76
28 C.F.R. § 80.1 (2014).
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requestor’s conduct conforms to present FCPA enforcement policy,
there will be a rebuttable presumption that the requestor’s conduct is
in compliance with the FCPA.77 Notably, although the DOJ
specifically denies that its public releases of advisory opinions have
precedential value, the DOJ has followed a trend of extending to new
cases an “analytical framework” that it previously applied to a similar
category of cases or situations.78 This appears to indicate that the
DOJ’s previous guidance influences its future analyses of similar
situations or circumstances.79
A.

Uncertain Beginnings

The original 1977 version of the FCPA had no mention of an
advisory opinion procedure or review procedure, and the legislative
history does not appear to have contemplated such a procedure.80 At
the direction of President Carter in 1978, the DOJ responded to the
uncertainty claimed by some sectors of the business community by
establishing its first attempt at an FCPA review procedure in March
1980.81 The original version of the review procedure gave the DOJ
great leeway, as the DOJ was not required to issue a response, had
the freedom to state, or refuse to state, its enforcement intentions, and
even had the ability to promise only a “‘reasonable effort’ to respond
within thirty days.”82 The original rule also failed in stating the exact
impact of an opinion letter from the DOJ and did not provide much
confidentiality.83
Initial fears for businesses contemplating the FCPA review
procedure included the SEC and the DOJ potentially reaching

77

See id. § 80.10.
ABIKOFF, supra note 75, at n.14 (citing, as evidence of trends, DOJ Opinion
Procedure Releases No. 10-03 and 11-01).
79
Id.
80
Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 95-640 (1977); S. REP. NO. 95-114 (1977); H.R.
REP. NO. 95-831 (1977) (Conf. Rep.)). However, the conferees, in considering the
FCPA legislation, recognized inherent difficulties with clarity and enforcement.
H.R. REP. NO. 95-831, at 14 (1977) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4121, 4126.
81
ABIKOFF, supra note 75; see 28 C.F.R. § 50 (1980).
82
ABIKOFF, supra note 75 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 50.18 (1980)).
83
Id.
78
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different interpretations on the legality of a business’s prospective
conduct,84 the DOJ’s ability to continually demand additional
supporting documents,85 and the possibility of the agencies’ opinion
releases being too narrow to provide adequate assurances against
prosecution.86
By 1983, the chilling effect on businesses in response to FCPA
uncertainties became widely recognized.87 The lack of clarity in the
FCPA provisions created problematic and unnecessary burdens on
businesses and individuals required to comply with the law.88
B.

Increasing Clarity: The 1988 and 1992 Changes to the FCPA
Opinion Process and the 2012 Guidance

Amendments to the FCPA in 1988 created a procedure for the
Attorney General to issue guidelines, while also requiring the DOJ to
create an updated procedure for providing advisory opinion letters.89
Legislative history shows that the FCPA Opinion Procedure was
intended to clarify the DOJ’s enforcement intentions under the FCPA
with respect to specific business transactions, while maintaining the
confidentiality of documents that were submitted under this
84

Id. (“This fear was initially buttressed by the SEC’s refusal to participate in
the review process . . . . Nevertheless, the SEC issued a statement that it would not
commence any enforcement action against a company that received a favorable
DOJ letter prior to May 31, 1981. This policy was later extended indefinitely and
has not been altered since.”); see also S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 11–12 (1977), as
reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098, 4109–10 (explaining the carefully
considered division of enforcement of the FCPA between the SEC and the DOJ).
85
ABIKOFF, supra note 75. Unfortunately, this fear has not yet been fully
abated. Id.; see 28 C.F.R. § 80.7 (2014) (“[T]he [DOJ] may request whatever
additional information or documents it deems necessary to review the matter.”).
86
ABIKOFF, supra note 75. This fear has also not been properly dealt with at
the time of the current writing, as the DOJ “continues to issue opinion letters that
tend to be couched in narrow, tentative terms.” Id.
87
Id.
88
S. REP. NO. 98-207, at 4 (Aug. 3, 1983).
89
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendment of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, §
102 Stat. 1107, 1417 (1988); see also H.R. REP. NO. 100-576, at 923 (1988) (Conf.
Rep.), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1547, 1956 (discussing the House of
Representatives’ bill that would create an opinion procedure allowing for DOJ
advisory opinions in response to specific firm inquiries concerned about their
FCPA conduct conformance).
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procedure.90
Shortly thereafter in 1992, the DOJ created the current formal
advisory opinion process, the DOJ Opinion Procedure, through which
businesses and individuals obtain an advisory opinion of the Attorney
General on whether their prospective future conduct conforms with
the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions.91 In 2012, the DOJ, along with
the SEC, released a long-awaited Resources Guide to the FCPA,
which provided a detailed analysis of the FCPA and closely
examined how both agencies approached enforcement of the FCPA.92
Currently, all of the DOJ FCPA enforcement actions93 and FCPA
Opinion Procedure releases94 are available on the DOJ’s website. In
an effort to improve transparency, the DOJ FCPA website was
revamped in 2013 to organize the opinion releases into eighteen
subject matter areas from “Audit Rights” to the “Written Laws
Affirmative Defense.”95
IV.

WHEN TO USE THE DOJ OPINION PROCEDURE

Before proceeding with the FCPA Opinion Procedure, it is
important for businesses to consider whether the time and effort
involved in preparing and submitting a request is worth the expense
and potentially negative implications of the request. Notably, “[t]he

90

132 CONG. REC. H2977-01 (daily ed. May 20, 1986) (joint statement of Rep.
John D. Dingell & Rep. Timothy E. Wirth) (discussing the purpose, proposed
practice, and intentions behind the DOJ FCPA Opinion Procedure).
91
ABIKOFF, supra note 75.
92
RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 15 (noting that the Guide includes
“hypotheticals, examples of enforcement actions and matters that the SEC and DOJ
have declined to pursue, and summaries of applicable case law and DOJ opinion
releases”); see also Legal Aspects of International Sourcing § 12.19 (2013)
(providing an overview and discussing the historical context of the Resource
Guide).
93
FCPA and Related Enforcement Actions, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/a.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2014)
(providing a helpful list of FCPA, or FCPA-related, enforcement actions by the
DOJ that may be arranged alphabetically or chronologically).
94
Index to Releases, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE FRAUD SEC.,
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/index/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2014)
(providing all relevant DOJ FCPA Opinion Releases divided by topic).
95
Id.; see 2013 Year-End FCPA Update, supra note 34.
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DOJ has published [opinion] releases on a range of FCPA issues and
in nearly every instance the DOJ has stated its intention not to bring
an enforcement action with respect to the proposed conduct based on
the proactive compliance measures disclosed by the company in
seeking the opinion.”96 In fact, DOJ attorneys have indicated that
they look favorably on businesses that engage in the DOJ Opinion
Procedure, as opinion requests indicate a robust FCPA compliance
process.97
However, if a business does not submit an opinion request when
faced with an uncertain FCPA situation, the DOJ may interpret the
business’s failure to submit an opinion adversely. After bringing
FCPA enforcement actions against companies, the DOJ has claimed
that if companies were uncertain about FCPA enforcement, they
should have used their ability to request an opinion pursuant to the
FCPA Opinion Procedure.98
The DOJ considers the FCPA Opinion Procedure as “unique
among the criminal laws,” “soft” precedent, and ultimately as “the
best procedure” for handling business concerns related to the
FCPA.99 The DOJ sees the FCPA Opinion Procedure as providing

96

Mike Koehler, Revisiting A Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Compliance
Defense, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 609, 648 (2012) (emphasis added) (discussing DOJ
FCPA Opinion Procedure Release examples).
97
See, e.g., Alexandra Wrage, Approaching the Sphinx: The DOJ's Opinion
Release
Procedure,
TRACEBLOG,
(Mar.
2,
2009),
http://traceblog.org/2009/03/02/approaching-the-sphinx-the-dojs-opinion-releaseprocedure/.
98
See Brief for the United States at 60–61 n.15, United States v. Esquenazi,
752 F.3d 912 (11th Cir. 2012) (No. 11-15331-C), 2012 WL 3638390, at *44–45
n.15 (citing DOJ FCPA Opinion Procedure as an avenue defendants failed to use
that would have successfully resolved the alleged ambiguity); Brief for the United
States at 60 n.20, United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 2007) (Nos. 0520604, 05-20606), 2006 WL 5582336, at *60 (stating that if defendants were
uncertain about FCPA enforcement against their bribes, they could have requested
an opinion pursuant to the DOJ FCPA Opinion Procedure); Brief for PlaintiffsAppellees and Cross-Appellants at 69–70, Fabri v. United Techs. Int’l, Inc., 387
F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 2004) (No. 03-7090 (L)), 2003 WL 25905485, at *69–70
(arguing that the defendant failed to pursue a DOJ FCPA opinion to avoid further
scrutiny from the DOJ into its other criminal conduct).
99
Examining Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Crime and Drugs of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th
Cong. 7 (2010) (statement of DOJ Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen. Greg Andres),
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concerned companies with “explicit guidance”; for example, when
companies have questions about who constitutes a public official,
they may ask and thereby obligate the DOJ to provide an advisory
opinion on the particular issue.100 While the DOJ recognizes that the
FCPA Opinion Procedure has been historically underutilized, the
agency consistently encourages companies to request assistance
before committing a potential FCPA violation.101 The DOJ sees a
more robust FCPA Opinion Procedure system as serving both the
interests of businesses and the DOJ, as well as the SEC’s interest in
avoiding FCPA violations before they occur.102
A.

Concerns Associated with Opinion Requests

However, there are several potential concerns—real and
imagined—that deter businesses from submitting requests for
advisory opinions.103 First and foremost, potential requestors fear the
implications of a negative opinion from the DOJ with regard to future
dealings with the agency.104 For example, a company considering

available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg66921/pdf/CHRG111shrg66921.pdf (stating that the DOJ FCPA Opinion Procedure “is unique
among the criminal laws. Those opinions are published and available to companies
to analyze them, to understand where the government is focusing its enforcement,
and what specifically violates the law.”).
100
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime,
Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 68
(2011), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/_files/hearings/printers/112th/11247_66886.pdf (statement of DOJ Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen. Greg Andres).
101
See Alice S. Fisher, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Prepared Remarks at the American Bar Association National Institute on the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 7–8 (Oct. 16, 2006), available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/pr/speech/2006/10-1606AAGFCPASpeech.pdf.
102
See id.
103
See Opinion Procedure Releases, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2014)
(documenting one opinion release in 2013, two opinion releases in 2012, one in
2011, three in 2010, and one in 2009); Juedes, supra note 20, at 51–52 (theorizing
reasons for the FCPA Opinion Procedure’s disuse).
104
Michael B. Mukasey & James C. Dunlop, Can Someone Please Turn on the
Lights? Bringing Transparency to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 13 ENGAGE:
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whether to submit an opinion request concerning its due diligence
obligations toward third-parties in a potential acquisition may fear
being asked by the DOJ to explain and defend its current internal due
diligence process.105 Companies are also frequently (and reasonably)
concerned with the DOJ requesting additional information if the
agency determines that the information submitted is insufficient.106
Although a company has the option to withdraw its opinion request at
any time,107 this does not alleviate the concern that withdrawing a
pending request may pique the curiosity of the DOJ.108
Similarly, a requestor may fear what the DOJ’s answer could
mean in future litigation—especially in light of historic FCPA fines
and settlements.109 If a proposed transaction is not permitted by the
DOJ through its advisory opinion, and the requestor moves forward
in one way or another, such action may be tantamount to an
admission that the requestor had knowledge that a payment was
corrupt or improper.110 Accordingly, requestors should evaluate the
costs, benefits, and risks when filing an opinion request and be
prepared to refrain from the proposed transaction if it is not

J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 49, 52 (2012), available at http://www.fedsoc.org/library/doclib/20120405_MukaseyDunlopEngage13.1.pdf.
105
Wrage, supra note 97.
106
Hinchey, supra note 16, at 423; see 28 C.F.R. § 80.7 (2014).
107
28 C.F.R. § 80.15 (2014).
108
Wrage, supra note 97; see Juedes, supra note 20, at 51 (“[T]he [DOJ FCPA
Opinion] process may be seen as mere ‘window dressing’ by firms and actually
alert law enforcement to potential illegal bribery.”).
109
See, e.g., Richard L. Cassin, Alcoa Lands 5th on our Top Ten List, THE
FCPA
BLOG
(Jan.
10,
2014,
1:08
AM),
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2014/1/10/alcoa-lands-5th-on-our-top-ten-list.html
(listing the Top Ten FCPA enforcement actions of all time: (1) Siemens, $800
million in 2008; (2) KBR/Halliburton, $579 million in 2009; (3) BAE, $400
million in 2010; (4) Total S.A., $398 million in 2013; (5) Alcoa, $384 million in
2014; (6) Snamprogetti Netherlands B.V./ENI S.p.A, $365 million in 2010; (7)
Technip S.A., $338 million in 2010; (8) JGC Corporation, $218.8 million in 2011;
(9) Daimler AG, $185 million in 2010; and (10) Weatherford International, $152.6
million in 2013).
110
Carl Pacini et al., Enhanced Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act: Improving the Ethics of U.S. Business Practices Abroad, in RESEARCH ON
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND ETHICS IN ACCOUNTING 77 (Cynthia Jeffrey
ed. 2012).
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sanctioned by the DOJ.111
Additionally, because the DOJ Opinion Procedure can be
cumbersome and untimely, many potential businesses do not take
advantage of the procedure.112 This is often because businesses
cannot afford the thirty days it may take the DOJ to evaluate a
transaction or venture, when crucial efforts to negotiate, structure,
and finalize the transaction may be required.113
B.

Proceeding with the DOJ Opinion Procedure in Light of its
Drawbacks

Considering these potential concerns, a business should use the
DOJ FCPA Opinion Procedure when the business (1) is truly
uncertain about the lawfulness of a proposed transaction or
payments; (2) believes the information it will provide to the DOJ will
not be disclosed (or will not cause injury if disclosed); and (3)
believes that the protection afforded to the opinion request outweighs
potential harm to the requestor if it does not disclose and is later
challenged.114
Although the effort involved in obtaining an FCPA Opinion is
admittedly burdensome,115 the clarity that opinion releases provide
allows companies to move forward with thorny transactions
confidently.116 For example, a U.S.-based Fortune 500 company that

111

Id.
Mukasey & Dunlop, supra note 104, at 52.
113
Id.
114
RALPH H. FOLSOM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS 553 (3d ed. 2013).
115
Michael J. Gilbert, FCPA ‘Opinion Requests’ Key in Enforcement Barrage,
238
N.Y.
L.J.
114,
115
(June
16,
2008),
available
at
http://www.dechert.com/files/Publication/6aa98e29-e940-43ba-85e58cfc138d7cf4/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/fe85ff4a-c119-4e2d-92d3934436201f01/NYLJ_Article_(FCPA)08.pdf (“a requestor (or its counsel) will
likely be required to review documents, interview key players, perform an
extensive background check on relevant entities and persons, and familiarize itself
with applicable local law . . . .”).
116
Id. (“FCPA issues can be complicated and lead to significant uncertainty.
Too often companies and their counsel, faced with a potentially problematic
transaction, take on themselves the unnecessary burden of predicting the
112
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was considering whether to acquire a controlling position in a foreign
company became concerned about buying into a significant FCPA
problem.117 However, instead of canceling the transaction or moving
forward with it and assuming implicit risk, the company requested a
DOJ FCPA Opinion Release.118 The company proceeded with its
request despite being faced with both complicated facts and the
foreign government’s strict time deadlines.119
Seeking an expedited review, the company submitted its request
on January 2, 2008.120 The DOJ completed its review in a timely
manner and issued its opinion release, blessing the transaction only
thirteen days later on January 15th.121 The DOJ’s opinion release in
this situation presents several lessons for potential requestors: first,
the timeliness of the DOJ’s response to the requestor appears to
indicate the agency’s willingness to work with companies that
approach it prior to a transaction closing; second, the DOJ recognizes
and approves of a requestor’s “remarkable” due diligence in
consulting with FCPA enforcement agencies before concluding
potentially problematic transactions.122
Fortunately, the DOJ’s willingness to provide opinion releases on
expedited schedules appears to be a burgeoning trend.123 Due to the
nature of business negotiations, companies are not likely to have
complete information about the structure of a pending transaction
until right before the transaction closes—which is usually when a
business is least likely to stop and allow the DOJ to consider an
opinion request.124 However, relatively recent FCPA opinions have
been issued in record time and on expedited schedules, with the

government’s eventual view of the situation. Instead, they should consider simply
asking.”).
117
Id. at 114. (citing U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES
ACT REVIEW: OPINION PROCEDURE RELEASE NO. 08-01 (Jan. 15, 2008), available
at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/2008/0801.pdf).
118
Id.
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
See Mark Miller, FCPA Opinion Procedure: DOJ’s Speed Improves, NAT’L
L.J. (Aug. 4, 2008).
124
Id. (“For a company in a hurry, even 30 days can be too long.”).
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turnaround time on one request being a remarkable four days.125 For
example, for Release No. 2008-02,126 the requestor, Halliburton, was
bidding for a U.K.-based company, but the U.K. takeover rules did
not allow Halliburton the luxury of conducting FCPA due diligence
before the transaction’s closing and also limited the information
Halliburton could obtain prior to closing.127 Although the rapidly
approaching bidding deadlines meant the DOJ had only a few days to
issue its opinion, the DOJ was able to mobilize its attorneys, obtain
its necessary agency approvals, and issue the release in time without
holding up the transaction.128 The story of the Halliburton opinion
release exemplifies the FCPA Opinion Procedure at its best—when
the DOJ was able to issue its opinion on a timetable consistent with
the “get-it-done-yesterday needs of a significant international
transaction.”129
Finally, in deciding whether to make an FCPA Opinion Request,
companies should note that in nearly every one of DOJ’s published
FCPA releases, on a divergent range of issues, the DOJ has decided
not to bring an enforcement action against the proposed conduct
based in large part on the requestor’s proactive measures in seeking
the DOJ’s opinion.130 In numerous instances, the DOJ has
125

Id.
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT REVIEW:
OPINION PROCEDURE RELEASE NO. 08-02 (June 13, 2008), available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/2008/0802.pdf.
127
Miller, supra note 123.
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
See, i.e., Koehler, supra note 96, at 648 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT REVIEW: OPINION PROCEDURE RELEASE NO.
09-01
(Aug.
3,
2009),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/2009/0901.pdf) (noting that in
Opinion Procedure Release 09-01, the DOJ stated its intention not to take
enforcement action with respect to requestor’s proposal to provide sample medical
devices to a foreign government for a total of $1.9 million for all units, in part
because the requestor stated that it did not believe the senior official suggesting the
donation would personally benefit); Koehler, supra note 96, at 648–49 (citing U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT REVIEW: OPINION
PROCEDURE RELEASE NO. 07-01 (July 24, 2007), available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/2007 /0701.pdf) (noting that in
Opinion Procedure Release 07-01, the DOJ stated that it did not intend to take
enforcement action against a requestor who proposed to cover domestic expenses
126
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recognized a requestor’s good-faith efforts to comply with the FCPA
by proactive compliance measures such as the DOJ FCPA Opinion
Procedure.131
V.

PROCEDURE FOR OBTAINING DOJ FCPA OPINION RELEASES
A.

Informal Discussions Prior to Formal Requests

Because the opinion procedure process can be lengthy and costly
for requestors who are unprepared, the process should not be
undertaken lightly.132
DOJ officials recommend prospective
requestors meet with them informally, prior to making a formal
request, to prevent an onerous process.133 Such informal meetings
can be helpful to determine whether an opinion request should be
pursued, and if so, may aid in narrowing potential issues and
identifying information that will be required by the DOJ for the
opinion.134
B.

Content Requirements for FCPA Opinion Requests

Requests must be in writing and include all relevant and material
information that bears on the conduct for which an FCPA Opinion is
requested, as well as the circumstances of the prospective conduct.135
This includes “background information, complete copies of all
operative documents, and detailed statements of [any and] all
collateral or oral understandings.”136 The request must concern non-

for an Asian country’s delegation trip to the United States because the purpose of
the trip was to familiarize the delegates with the requestor’s operations and because
the requestor represented that it would not host entertainment for the officials nor
provide them with spending money or stipends).
131
Koehler, supra note 96, at 649.
132
STUART H. DEMING, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT AND THE NEW
INTERNATIONAL NORMS 27 (2d ed. 2010).
133
Id.
134
Id.
135
28 C.F.R. §§ 80.2, 80.6 (2014).
136
See id. § 80.6.
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hypothetical, specified, and prospective conduct.137 Having an
executed contract is not a prerequisite, “and, in most . . . instances, an
opinion request should be made before the requestor commits to
proceed[ing] with a transaction.”138 A number of FCPA Opinion
Request forms and templates are available electronically and in
print.139
Before making the request, the company or individual requestor
should ensure that they are either an issuer or a domestic concern, as
only those categories of parties may receive an opinion.140 However,
if there is more than one issuer or domestic concern involved in the
transaction, the requestor should consider making a joint request for
an opinion, as opinions apply only to the parties that request them.141
The requesting party has an affirmative obligation to make full
and true disclosures with respect to its prospective conduct.142 Each
request must be signed by an appropriate senior officer (1) “with
operational responsibility for the conduct that is the subject of the
request” and (2) who has been designated by the requestor’s CEO to
sign the opinion request.143 In certain cases, the DOJ may require the
CEO to sign the opinion request.144

137

28 C.F.R. § 80.1 (2014). Although the subject of the request need not
involve “only prospective conduct,” a request is not considered by the DOJ “unless
that portion of the transaction for which an opinion is sought involves only
prospective conduct.” 28 C.F.R. § 80.3 (2014).
138
RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 15, at 86.
139
See SECURITIES LAW TECHNIQUES APPENDIX, 82F (A.A. Sommer, Jr., ed.,
1997 & Supp. 2013) (providing a form outline of a company’s request to the DOJ
for an FCPA Opinion in the context of a proposed joint venture; it is available
online through Lexis or in print through Matthew Bender publications). Id. at 82D
(providing a form for two entities engaging in a joint venture to make
representations and warranties with regard to FCPA compliance and specifically to
FCPA Opinion Requests as a possible prerequisite for either party in assigning its
rights to a third party).
140
FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions apply to U.S. persons and businesses
(“domestic concerns”), and the FCPA’s accounting provisions apply to public
companies that are either listed on stock exchanges or are required to file periodic
SEC reports (“issuers”). RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 15, at 2, 86.
141
Id. at 86.
142
Id. at 87.
143
Id.
144
Id.
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If the requestor’s submission lacks any required information, “the
[DOJ] may request whatever additional information or documents it
deems necessary to review the matter.”145 However, the DOJ is
required to make any additional information requests within thirty
days.146 Following a DOJ additional information request, the
requestor must provide the information to the DOJ promptly, as a
request “will not be deemed complete until the [DOJ] receives such
additional information.”147 The additional information may be
provided orally, promptly confirmed in writing, and signed and
certified by the same individual who signed the initial request.148
C.

Submission and Delivery

A request for a DOJ FCPA Opinion is required to be in writing
and should be addressed to the Assistant Attorney General in charge
of the Criminal Division.149 There should be an original and five
copies of the request.150
D.

DOJ Actions in Response to an FCPA Opinion Request

Within thirty days after receiving a request in accordance with the
above procedure, the Attorney General (or his designee) must
respond to the request by issuing an opinion that notes whether the
prospective conduct violates the applicable FCPA provisions151 for
purposes of the DOJ’s present enforcement policy.152 The DOJ may

145

28 C.F.R. § 80.7 (2014).
Id.
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
28 C.F.R. § 80.2 (2014) (The request should be addressed as follows:
Attention: FCPA Opinion Group, P.O. Box 28188, Central Station, Washington,
D.C. 20038. The address for hand delivery is Room 2424, Bond Building, 1400
New York Avenue NW, Washington, D.C. 20005.).
150
Id.
151
15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to 78dd-2 (2012).
152
28 C.F.R. § 80.8 (2014); see also 28 C.F.R. § 80.13 (2014) (“An FCPA
Opinion will state only the Attorney General’s opinion as to whether the
prospective conduct would violate the Department’s present enforcement policy
under 15 U.S.C. 78dd-1 and 78dd-2.”).
146
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not, however, orally provide clearance, release, or other statements
purporting to limit its enforcement discretion.153 Notably, the DOJ
has reserved the right to take other positions or actions, as it
considers appropriate.154
E.

FCPA Opinion Release’s Effect on Requestors

An FCPA Opinion applies only to the party requesting it and has
no application to parties that do not join the request for the
opinion.155 FCPA Opinion request submissions and FCPA Opinion
releases do not alter the responsibility of a requestor to comply with
the FCPA’s recordkeeping provision156 and accounting
requirements.157 If the Attorney General issues an opinion that the
requestor’s conduct conforms to the DOJ’s present FCPA
enforcement policy, there will be a rebuttable presumption that the
requestor’s conduct is in compliance with the FCPA against any
action brought against the requestor.158
However, an FCPA Opinion does not bind or obligate agencies
other than the DOJ, nor does it affect the requestor’s obligations to
other agencies.159 Though the SEC does not have an equivalent
procedure, it has taken the position that it will not take civil
enforcement action under the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA

153

28 C.F.R.§ 80.9 (2014); see also DEMING, supra note 132, at 26 (“Reliance
can be placed only on a written opinion and not on oral statements by Justice
Department officials.”).
154
28 C.F.R. § 80.8 (2014).
155
28 C.F.R. § 80.5 (2014).
156
15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)–78m(b)(3) (2012).
157
Id.; 28 C.F.R. § 80.12 (2014).
158
28 C.F.R. § 80.10 (2014). However, this presumption can be rebutted by a
preponderance of evidence; in evaluating the presumption, a court weighs all
relevant factors, “including but not limited to whether information submitted to the
Attorney General was accurate and complete and whether the activity was within
the scope of the conduct specified in any request received by the Attorney
General.” Id.
159
28 C.F.R. § 80.11 (2014); see 28 C.F.R. § 80.13 (2014) (“If the conduct for
which an FCPA Opinion is requested is subject to approval by any other agency,
such FCPA Opinion shall in no way be taken to indicate the Department of
Justice’s views on the legal or factual issues that may be raised before that agency,
or in an appeal from the agency’s decision.”).
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against a party that has obtained a favorable DOJ opinion.160
However, a favorable opinion does not preclude action by the SEC or
the DOJ relative to the FCPA accounting and record-keeping
provisions (or to any other statutory or regulatory provisions).161
F.

Public Disclosure of Requestor’s Opinion Request

FCPA Opinion requests are exempt from disclosure under 5
U.S.C. section 552 and are not made publicly available, except with
the consent of the requestor.162 However, this does not limit the
DOJ, at its discretion, from issuing a release “describing” the
requestor’s identity, the foreign country’s identity where the
proposed conduct may take place, and the DOJ’s proposed action in
response to the FCPA Opinion request.163 The DOJ maintains that
such public releases do not disclose identifying information.164
A requestor is permitted to ask the DOJ to not disclose the
requestor’s “proprietary information” in the DOJ’s release.165
However, the language of the regulation does not appear to require
the DOJ to comply with such requests.166
G.

Withdrawing FCPA Opinion Requests or Submitting
Additional Requests

A requestor has the option of withdrawing the FCPA request
prior to the Attorney General’s response to such a request.167 In the
case of withdrawal, “[t]he [DOJ] reserves the right to retain any
FCPA Opinion request[s], documents and information submitted” for
the request in order to use them for “any governmental purposes”

160

DEMING, supra note 132, at 26 (citing Statement of Commission Policy
Concerning Section 30A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act
Release No. 181255, 4 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 26, 629 (Nov. 12, 1981)).
161
Id.
162
5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012); 28 C.F.R. § 80.14 (2014).
163
28 C.F.R. § 80.14 (2014).
164
Id.
165
Id. § 80.14(b).
166
See id. § 80.14.
167
28 C.F.R. § 80.15 (2014).
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subject to some restrictions.168
If, after receiving a DOJ opinion, a requestor is concerned about
prospective conduct beyond the scope of the conduct specified in
prior requests, the requestor may submit additional FCPA Opinion
requests using the same opinion request procedure.169
VI.

DO THE BENEFITS OF THE DOJ FCPA OPINION PROCEDURE
EXTEND TO INSTANCES OF VOLUNTEER FCPA DISCLOSURES?

While the DOJ appears to positively receive FCPA Opinion
requests as reflections of a company’s robust FCPA compliance
policy, does the same attitude extend to voluntary admissions of
FCPA violations? While voluntary disclosures of potential FCPA
violations may appear, at face value, to potentially mitigate penalties
for corporate FCPA noncompliance, the truth seems to be less clearcut based on empirical evidence.
Voluntary disclosure occurs when a business approaches
enforcement officials about potential FCPA violations prior to, and
independent of, an investigation.170 The DOJ, through memoranda171
and speeches,172 consistently expresses its position that voluntary

168

Id. (“subject to the restrictions on disclosures in § 80.14”).
28 C.F.R. § 80.16 (2014); see RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 15, at 87.
170
Hinchey, supra note 16, at 396.
171
See, e.g., Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S.
Dep't of Justice, to Heads of Department Components and U.S. Attorneys (July 5,
2007) (noting that "prosecutors may consider a corporation's timely and voluntary
disclosure in evaluating the adequacy of the corporation's compliance program and
its management's commitment to the compliance program.").
172
See Gary G. Grindler, Acting Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Address at the 2010 Compliance Week Conference (May 25, 2010),
http://www.justice.gov/dag/speeches/2010/dag-speech-100525.html (noting that
cooperation is evaluated “during the prosecutorial decision-making process”);
Lanny Breuer, Assistant Att'y Gen., Criminal Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Prepared
Address to the 22nd National Forum on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 3 (Nov.
17, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches-testimony/documents/1117-09aagbreuer-remarks-fcpa.pdf (noting voluntary disclosures that “we certainly
encourage and will appropriately reward”); Alice Fisher, Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Prepared Remarks at the American Bar Association National
Institute on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 6 (Oct. 16, 2006),
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/pr/speech/2006/10-1606AAGFCPASpeech.pdf (“[I]f you are doing the things you should be doing—
169
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disclosures are considered by the DOJ, factored into DOJ
enforcement, and may mitigate potential corporate noncompliance
penalties.173
Regarding the specific benefits of disclosure, however, the DOJ
is consistently vague as to what, if any, benefits are actually
conferred to disclosing corporations.174
Recent increased
enforcement and record-breaking FCPA settlements have led many to
question whether there exists any tangible benefit for voluntarily
disclosing potential FCPA violations.175
Such criticism began to mount after the In re Schnitzer Steel
Industries, Inc. settlement, in which Schnitzer Steel voluntarily
disclosed bribes that a subsidiary had made to Chinese officials in
order to gain a competitive advantage.176 Despite Schnitzer Steel’s
“exceptional cooperation”177 with the DOJ, the company still faced
approximately $15 million in fines from the DOJ and the SEC for the
$1.9 million paid in bribes by their subsidiary.178 The Schnitzer Steel
case has been repeatedly cited by critics of voluntary disclosure,
arguing that the disproportionate fine levied against the company
indicates recent FCPA enforcement trends do not reflect the promises

whether it is self-policing, self-reporting, conducting proactive risk assessments,
improving your controls and procedures . . . you will get a benefit . . . . [Voluntary
disclosure] may not mean that you or your client will get a complete pass, but you
will get a real, tangible benefit.”).
173
Hinchey, supra note 16, at 397.
174
See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 172, at 6 (qualifying the benefits of voluntary
disclosure by stating that “it would not make sense for law enforcement to make
one-size-fits-all promises about the benefits of voluntary disclosure before getting
all of the facts.”).
175
Hinchey, supra note 16, at 397.
176
In re Schnitzer Steel Indus., Inc., 89 S.E.C. Docket 302, 2006 WL 2987067,
at *2–5; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Former Senior Officer of Schnitzer
Steel Industries Inc. Subsidiary Pleads Guilty to Foreign Bribes (June 29, 2007),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2007/June/07_crm_474.html.
177
Fisher, supra note 172, at 5.
178
Jessica Tillipman, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Fundamentals, BRIEFING
PAPERS (THOMSON WEST), No. 08-10 (Sept. 2008), at 14–15,
http://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=
1038&context=faculty_publications (noting that Schnitzer Steel was fined $7.5
million in criminal penalties and $7.7 million in disgorgement); see In re Schnitzer
Steel, 2006 WL 2987067, at *7; Press Release, supra note 176.
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of enforcement leniency for self-reporting and cooperation.179
Confusingly, however, the DOJ has highlighted Schnitzer Steel
as “an excellent example of how voluntary disclosure followed by
extraordinary cooperation with the Department results in a real,
tangible benefit to the company.”180 Specifically, the DOJ cites
Schnitzer Steel’s model cooperation as “critical” to its ability to
obtain a deferred prosecution agreement and result in a DOJ
recommendation that the company’s subsidiary pay “a criminal fine
well below what it would otherwise have received.”181 However, the
DOJ’s position regarding the benefits of Schnitzer Steel’s voluntary
disclosure appears misguided and has been heavily criticized in light
of comparable fines or less severe fines that the DOJ has since issued
to companies found liable for FCPA violations without voluntary
disclosures.182
How then to proceed, with specific and consistent declarations
from the DOJ vaguely singing the benefits of voluntary disclosure on
one hand, and skeptical authors and commentators citing the unclear,
allegedly nonexistent benefits of disclosure on the other? After an
ambitious attempt to empirically determine if a pattern exists
between the levels of bribes paid and the amount of fines levied due
to those bribes in cases of voluntary and non-voluntary disclosures

179

See Hinchey, supra note 16, at 398; Tillipman, supra note 178, at 14
(“Although the Government claims it will reward companies that self-report
improper activity, a review of recent enforcement actions demonstrates that the
SEC and the DOJ are still likely to impose harsh penalties on companies that
voluntarily disclose FCPA violations.”); see also Michael Freedman, Trust Us,
FORBES,
(Dec.
9,
2006),
http://members.forbes.com/forbes/2006/1225/132.html?token=MTggT2N0IDIwM
DcgMTU6MzE6MzggKzAwMDA%253D (noting that the benefit to Schnitzer
Steel from its voluntary disclosure is “hard to discern”).
180
Fisher, supra note 172, at 5.
181
Id.
182
See, e.g., Tillipman, supra note 178, at 15 (noting that: “after Schnitzer
Steel voluntarily disclosed a $1.9 million improper payment, the Government fined
the company $7.5 million in criminal penalties and $7.7 million in disgorgement.
In contrast, after the Government learned of Statoil ASA’s $5.2 million in improper
payments . . . the U.S. Government fined the company $10.5 million in criminal
penalties and $10.5 million in disgorgement . . . A comparison of these two actions
does not adequately demonstrate the benefit Schnitzer received from its voluntary
disclosure.”).
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from 2002 to 2009,183 the author of the survey found that the data
indicates that “companies seem to face a penalty one and a half times
larger if they voluntarily disclose FCPA violations as compared to
companies that do not [voluntary disclose].”184
Hence, a very real possibility exists that a voluntarily-disclosing
company may face an FCPA penalty commensurate with, or even
higher than, a penalty levied upon a non-disclosing company’s
identical conduct.
Voluntary disclosure also forecloses the
possibility that the FCPA violations may not have been discovered in
the first place, had the company proceeded to immediately rectify the
situation without voluntarily disclosing.185 If the survey results and
academic criticisms are true, the current FCPA voluntary disclosure
system is undoubtedly problematic, as such inconsistent and random
penalties for responsible actors appear to remove incentives for
voluntary disclosure.186
VII.

CONCLUSION

As international anti-bribery and FCPA enforcement remains on
the rise, with increasingly aggressive enforcement and recordbreaking settlements and fines, the contours of the FCPA and what
exactly qualifies as a bribe to “foreign officials” remain unclear. In
light of this persistent uncertainty, the DOJ Opinion Procedure
remains an underutilized, useful tool for businesses that are: (1)
legitimately uncertain about the lawfulness of a proposed transaction
or of proposed payments, (2) believe the information they will
provide in the request will not be disclosed (or will not cause injury if
disclosed), and (3) believe that the protection afforded to the request

183

See Hinchey, supra note 16, at 399–408 (discussing the survey’s
methodology and means of analysis).
184
Id. at 406.
185
See id. at 418.
186
See id.; see also Freedman, supra note 179. (“Cases . . . are prompting
corporate defense lawyers to question the strategy of voluntary confessions . . . .
[C]ompanies are finding that by turning themselves in they are opening themselves
up to years of negative publicity, fines, criminal investigations, indictments and
highly intrusive compliance monitors . . . . ‘When you look at the [voluntary
disclosure] cases, they’re really all over the map. In some cases there appears to be
credit and in some cases not.’”).
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outweighs potential harm to the requestor if it does not disclose and
is later challenged.
However, the benefits, guidance, and good favor the DOJ
promises to companies that request a DOJ advisory opinion should
not be assumed to exist when contemplating voluntary disclosure of
FCPA violations.
Evidence suggests that the DOJ rhetoric
concerning the benefits of voluntary disclosure may not be in line
with actual practice. Accordingly, a business considering FCPA
compliance and guidance in the current climate of FCPA
enforcement is well-advised to proceed cautiously with voluntary
disclosures but to proceed significantly more comfortably with DOJ
Opinion Procedure requests.

